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Abstract: This is a contribution to the growing experimental literature on how trial-and-error 
adjustment processes can establish a convention for coordination on an equilibrium in a game. 
A simple bargaining game introduced by Nash is used for this purpose. Subjects are condi- 
tioned in different treatments to use four different bargaining solutions. The stability of the 
conditioning is then studied as the bargaining game is played over an extended period. The 
data obtained is unusually sharp. In the long run, the median subject behaves as though op- 
timizing often down to a fraction of a penny. The results are therefore not supportive of the 
view that strategic considerations in such situations can be neglected in favor of a study of 
fairness norms. Indeed, the equilibrium actually achieved in a session turns out to be a very 
good predictor of what the median subject says is "fair" in the game after play is over. 
Early mankind soon reached the grand generalization that everything has its 
price, everything can be paid for. Here we have the oldest and most naive 
moral canon of justice, of all "fair play", "good will", and "objectivity". Jus- 
tice at this level is good will operating among men of roughly equal power, 
their readiness to come to terms with one another, to strike a compromise 
o . ,  
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Generalogy of  Morals 
1 Introduction 
If I wait in the coffee shop for my wife while she searches for me in the car park, 
then we are experiencing a coordination failure. Schelling's [16] well known essay on 
coordination stresses the importance of focal points in such a context. The side of 
the road on which people drive is the standard example. Before any legislation ap- 
peared, it became focal to drive on the left in England,  but  to drive on the right in 
France. 
Although the idea of a focal point is of great practical importance, the manner  
in which focal points become established and survive after their establishment r e -  
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this paper under Grant NSF-SES-8821521. We also gratefully acknowledge funding from 
the University of Michigan to set up the Michigan Economics Laboratory, where the exper- 
iments were conducted. We would also like to thank Richard Stallman and the Free Soft- 
ware Foundation for developing EMACS, Luke Tierney for developing LISPSTAT, and 
Hal Varian for showing us how to use both. 
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mains a mystery. No consensus even exists about how this mystery should be inves- 
tigated. Some authors emphasize rationality considerations to the exclusion of all 
else. However, it seems doubtful that the equilibrium selection problem of game 
theory is likely to be solvable by a technique that ignores what may be common 
knowledge among the players about the social norms of their culture. At the other 
extreme are authors who argue that social norms are so important that strategic is- 
sues can be neglected altogether. This view tends to be expressed most forcefully 
when the coordination problem is framed in a bargaining context. Fairness norms 
then enter the picture - and there is much evidence that such norms often do take 
precedence over strategic considerations in determining the behavior of subjects in 
certain types of laboratory experiments. 
The story is further confused by the fact that those who emphasize rationality 
do not argue that real people are likely to find their way to what rationality sup- 
posedly recommends simply by thinking about the problem. Where pregame, cheap- 
talk sessions are not possible, the claim is that people will be able to find their way 
to the rational solution by trial-and-error if given long enough to gain experience of 
the game's strategic realities and the behavior of other members of the game-playing 
population. Nor are the views of those who emphasize social norms free from com- 
plication. They argue that several distinct social norms may compete for attention in 
certain contexts. So how do people decide which social norm should be honored? 
This paper seeks to investigate such questions experimentally, using an archety- 
pal example of a focal point problem. The example studied is the Nash [101 bargain- 
ing problem in which two players can achieve any point x in a given feasible set X 
provided that they can reach agreement. If they cannot agree, the result is a fixed 
disagreement point ~ in the set X. Although the paper can be seen as a contribution 
to the expanding literature on experimental bargaining games, its potential applica- 
tions to bargaining theory were a secondary consideration in our choosing the Nash 
bargaining problem for study. The primary reasons are twofold: 
1. The literature contains numerous rival candidates as focal points in the Nash 
bargaining problem. We consider the Nash [10] Bargaining Solution, the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky [8] Bargaining Solution, the Utilitarian Solution asso- 
ciated with Harsanyi [5] and the Equal Increments Solution a associated with 
Rawls [141. 
2. Unlike the situations studied in the related work of Cooper et al. [3], and 
Van Huyck et al. [17, 18], the Nash bargaining problem has a continuous 
strategy space. In a discrete problem, it may be hard to destabilize an estab- 
lished focal point. A population, for example, cannot gradually drift from 
driving on the left to driving on the right. 
In order to study the Nash bargaining problem, it is necessary to say what the 
players need to do to reach an agreement. The most primitive mechanism is repre- 
sented by the Nash [10] demand game and so we use this. In our experiment, a 
population of subjects play the same Nash demand game repeatedly, half the time as 
player I and half the time as player II, switching partners unpredictably after each 
2 The Pareto efficient point x ~ X  with x l -  ~1 =x2-~2. 
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play. At each play, a subject currently in the role of player I makes a demand x 1 and 
a subject in the role of player II makes a demand x2. Each subject makes his demand 
in ignorance of the current demand of the other subject. (However, in our experi- 
ment, much information about past plays of the population as a whole was made 
available using a graphic display to be described later.) If the point x=  (xl, x2) of a 
partnered pair of subjects proves to be feasible, each receives his or her demand. 
Otherwise each receives the disagreement payoff. In our case, this was always zero 
(i.e. ~= 0). 
Since conventional wisdom holds that the outcome in such a game depends on 
the players' attitudes toward risk, it is important to control for risk aversion. The 
standard technique is to pay subjects off in lottery tickets. In our case, the subjects 
had the opportunity to win $10 with a probability equal to the number of lottery 
tickets they had accumulated divided by 100. Rational agents would then be induced 
to behave as though they were risk neutral. To further impress the subjects with the 
importance of risk, lotteries were also introduced into each play of the game by 
fuzzing the boundary of the feasible set X. That is to say, the boundary of X was 
expanded into a narrow strip. The feasibility of pairs of demands falling in this strip 
was uncertain. If, for example, the pair of demands fell on an 80~ contour running 
through the strip, it would be found feasible by the computer with probability 0.8. 
We had a secondary motive in fuzzing the boundary which needs to be men- 
tioned at an early stage because the fuzzing was instrumental in generating results 
that took us by surprise. This was a desire to be faithful to Nash's [10] original 
conception. He transferred his attention from the original Nash demand game to a 
version with a fuzzed or smoothed boundary because, without the smoothing, any 
individually rational, Pareto efficient x in X is a Nash equilibrium for the Nash 
demand game. With the smoothing, all Nash equilibria approximate the Nash Bar- 
gaining Solution. (See papers 4 and 8 of Binmore and Dasgupta [1].) 
To see why such smoothing might help in responding to comment on the possi- 
ble results of the experiment, consider what conclusions might be drawn if the sub- 
jects were to coordinate on the Utilitarian Solution. Harsanyi [5] might argue that 
such subjects were motivated by moral considerations. A welfare economist might 
argue that the explanation is that the Utilitarian Solution is Pareto efficient for the 
population as a whole over the course of the experiment. However, a game theorist 
of the variety that believes that thinking alone is adequate to get subjects immediate- 
ly to the "right" Nash equilibrium would not be willing to admit that such normative 
considerations were necessarily relevant if the boundary of X were not fuzzed. He 
could simply point to the fact that the Utilitarian Solution is a Nash equilibrium like 
every other individually rational, Pareto efficient outcome of X. 
Although we prepared defenses in advance against certain potential criticisms 
by paying subjects off in lottery tickets (rather than directly in money) and by fuz- 
zing the boundary of the feasible set, we did not seriously anticipate that these refi- 
nements would have any impact on our results. Our guess was that subjects are ef- 
fectively risk neutral already with respect to the small sums of money we are able to 
pay. Moreover, after the fuzzing of the boundary of the feasible set, all the focal 
points we considered were within 0.1 of an e-equilibrium with e = 0.1. It did not 
occur to us at the outset that subjects would be interested in discriminating at the 0.1 
level, since 0.1 of a lottery ticket was worth only about a penny. However, our guess 
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about the level at which subjects would choose to discriminate turned out to be bad- 
ly wrong, and the results are perhaps more interesting than would have been the case 
if we had guessed right. To see why, it is necessary to continue outlining the design 
of the experiment. 
After a hands-on interactive session at their computer to learn the mechanics of 
the program, the subjects first played ten "practice" games "against the computer". 
Both when playing the computer and when playing real opponents, subjects some- 
times occupied the role of player I and sometimes the role of player II. Throughout 
the experiment, the subjects were shown the last demands made by all of their po- 
tential partners, both when the potential partner was player I and when he or she 
was player II. In the "practice games" this information display was used in a (suc- 
cessful) attempt to condition the subjects to begin the games against real opponents 
at one of the four "focal points" that we chose to study. For example, in the treat- 
ment designed to study the Equal Increments Solution as a possible focal point, the 
simulated potential partners that the subjects faced during the ten "practice games" 
were designed to converge slowly from a fixed initial configuration towards the 
Equal Incremenents Solution. After being conditioned to begin by making demands 
at or near the Equal Increments Solution, the question was then whether the subjects 
would continue to use this focal point once play against real opponents began. 
We would not have been surprised to find that all the focal points we studied 
were stable. We thought the Utilitarian Solution might be particularly attractive. 
However, this proved to be the hardest to condition for in our main experiment. But 
the chief conclusion to which we were led by the data swept aside our initial expec- 
tations. We found a very strong tendency of the median subject to optimize relent- 
lessly. Indeed, the extent of the optimization is almost absurd, since the subjects 
seem to have been sensitive to payoff differences right down to 0.01 of a lottery 
ticket (about one tenth of a penny). It is important to understand that the subjects 
were provided with graphic aids that made this possible for them to do reasonably 
efficiently if they so chose. In particular, they were provided with a display that 
allowed them to zero-in on the demand that would maximize their expected number 
of lottery tickets in the current game if their potential partners were to behave as 
they did the last time that they occupied their current role. Nevertheless, we were 
taken aback to find it necessary to compute the exact Nash equilibria of the discrete 
game that the digital character of computer technology made it necessary to present 
to the subjects in place of the continuous version that we had in mind as our basic 
model. 
In our experiment, this required looking at a 100 x 50 payoff matrix in which 
each player's pure strategies consist of all possible locations for the cursor that he or 
she used in specifying what demand to make. This moved in steps of 0.1 of a lottery 
ticket. Each lottery ticket increases the probability of winning $10 by 0.01. Tus 0.1 
of a lottery ticket corresponds to about one penny. 
Figure 1 is intended to illustrate the main conclusions (Case 1) reported in this 
paper. The region shown represents the feasible set X in each repetition of the Nash 
demand game. (The boundary shown is the 100% probability contour.) Coordinates 
are given as numbers of lottery tickets. The Equal Increments Solution, the Kalai- 
Smorodinsky Solution, the Nash Bargaining Solution and the Utilitarian Solution 
are indicated with the letters E, K, N and U respectively. The box contains all Nash 
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Fig. 1. Summary of results in Case 1 
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F3gure l (d)  : Case 1U 
equilibria of  the discrete  game. (Any Nash equilibrium of  the continuous version 
approximates  N.)  
The arrows in Figure 1 do not indicate trajectories.  Each of  the 16 sets of  ar- 
rows corresponds to a different group of  12 subjects and summarizes their exper- 
ience by linking three points.  Each point  is a pair  of  m e d i a n  3 demands.  The x-coor-  
dinate is the median demand of  player Is. The y-coordinate  is the median demand of  
player IIs. The three stages of  the experiment at which these numbers are reported in 
the figure are: 
1. At  the very beginning - i.e. in the first and second practice games before any 
experience had been gained 4. 
2. Immediate ly  after the practice games - i.e. in the 1 l th  and 12th plays that  
followed the 10 condit ioning practice games. 
3. At  the very end - i.e. in the 49th and 50th plays, after 10 practice games and 
40 real games. 
Three prel iminary conclusions are listed below: 
3 The median of a set of numbers with an even number of elements is the mean of the two 
middle numbers. 
4 The computer updated its display every second play. 
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9 Whatever social norms the subjects may bring into the laboratory are easily 
erasable in the circumstances of the experiment. The subjects can be condi- 
tioned to begin playing for real close to any of the four focal points E, K, N, 
or U. 
9 The focal points E and U are not stable. 
9 The explanation that groups of subjects converge on an exact Nash equili- 
brium of the discrete game that they actually played fits the data very well. 
It is natural to ask whether the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K would have been 
stable if it had not been included in the Nash equilibrium box. (One cannot, of 
course, exclude the Nash Bargaining Solution from the box.) One might also ask 
how the subjects would perform if not assisted with such a helpful graphic display. 
It is also interesting to know how the subjects responded to questions about "fair- 
ness" after playing the game. 
The first question is not easily answered because it is difficult to adapt our ex- 
perimental design to separate the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution and the Nash Bar- 
gaining Solution adequately. Nevertheless, we hope to investigate this question with 
experiments that use a revised feasible set and to report any interesting results in a 
subsequent paper. 
The extent to which our graphic display was essential to the results was explored 
in Case 2. Case 1E was modified so that the subjects were deprived of expected 
utility information in the graphic display. (Case 2 was otherwise identical to Case 
1E.) Perhaps surprisingly, the subjects' behavior was not very different from that 
when the expected utility information was provided. Even the amount of variance in 
the data was only slightly higher. However, we only gathered data on this issue in 
the case when subjects were conditioned on the Equal Increments Solution. 
Finally, the median of the claims reported as fair by each set of subjects after 
the experiment turned out to be closely correlated with the median of the claims 
actually made at the end of the experiment in which the subjects had participated. 
Very similar results were reported in Binmore et al. [2]. Perhaps we are therefore 
learning something about the origin of "fairness" norms. 
2 Theory 
This section begins by describing the ideas from cooperative bargaining theory used 
to locate the focal points in the experiment. Roth [15] discusses the properties and 
axiomatic characterization of the concepts. The remainder of the section briefly 
examines the problem of computing Nash equilibria in the smoothed Nash demand 
game. 
Focal Points and Bargaining 
2.1 Cooperative Solution Concepts 
387 
The unsmoothed feasible set X shown in Figure 2 is the convex hull of the points 
(0, 0), (10, 0), (0, 5), (4.1, 4.1), (6.8, 3.4), (8.4, 2.9) and (9.9, 2.1). (In the smoothed 
case, a belt of fuzz surrounds X as described in Section 2.2 and Section 3.) The 
shape of X was determined by the need to separate the focal points E, K, N, and U 
from each other. These four focal points are denoted by small boxes and labeled by 
letter in Figures 1, 2, and 4. The disagreement point ( is always (0, 0). 
Equal Increments Solution E. This is a special case of a proportional bargaining 
solution as studied by Raiffa [12], Isbell [6], Kalai [7], Myerson [9], Roth [15], 
Peters [11] and others. Like the Utilitarian Solution to be considered shortly, the 
Equal Increments Solution requires that there be some basis for interpersonal com- 
parison of utilities. This was provided in our experiments by the fact that the sub- 
jects alternated roles and were paid off in equally valuable lottery tickets both as 
player I and as player II. This same feature would also seem to justify restricting 
attention to cooperative bargaining solutions whose characterizations include a sym- 
metry axiom. A proportional bargaining solution places the bargaining outcome at 
the Pareto efficient point of X that lies on a line of fixed positive slope through the 
disagreement point (. The slope of this line equals the rate at which player I 's utils 
are to be compared with player II 's .  With a symmetry axiom, this rate is 1 and so the 
relevant line through ~ has slope 1. The Equal Increments Solution therefore awards 
each player the same increment on his or her disagreement payoff. For the bargain- 
ing set described above, the Equal Increments Solution is E =  (4.1, 4.1). It is worth- 
while noting that E is the point of X that will be selected by Rawls' [14] maximin 
criterion. 
Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution K. Kalai and Smorodinsky [8] offer this solution as an 
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Fig. 2. The feasible set, focal points, the exact Nash eqilibrium box, e-equilibria of the discrete 
game with e = 0.1, and initial robot claims 
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interpersonal comparisons of  utility. The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution is found in 
our case by first locating the (infeasible) "utopian point" (10, 5) at which each player 
gets his or her maximum possible demand. A straight line is then drawn joining the 
disagreement point ~ and the utopian point. The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution 
K =  (6.8, 3.4) is the Pareto efficient point of  X on this line. 
Nash Bargaining Solution N. Nash [10] characterized N =  (8.4, 2.9) as the value of  x 
in X satisfying x_> ~ at which the Nash product (Xl - ~ 1 ) ( x 2 -  ~2) is maximized. 
Utilitarian Solution U. The Utilitarian Solution U =  (9.9, 2.1) is the value of  x in X 
at which xl + x2 is maximized. Harsanyi [5] discusses its merits. 
2.2 Nash Equilibria in the Smoothed Game 
The details of  how the Nash Demand Game was smoothed for the experiment are 
now described. The continuous case is described first and then the discrete approxi- 
mation. 
The Continuous Version 
The smoothed version of  the Nash Demand Game was obtained by making 
some of  the demand pairs x = (xl, x2) outside X available with a specified probability 
p(x). If  the polar coordinates o f x  are (r, 0), and (R, O) is on the Pareto boundary of  
X, then 
I( p ( x ) =  1 - 1 - /y (R_<r_<(1 + y)R). 
If  r<R, then p ( x ) = l .  I f  r > ( l + y ) R ,  then p ( x ) = 0 .  Notice that Op/ar=O when 
r=R, so that probabilities change smoothly across the outermost 100% probability 
contour. Notice also that the region in which it is uncertain whether a particular 
demand pair x is available shrinks to nothing when y ~ 0 .  In the experimental imple- 
mentation, we took y = 0.1. 
Binmore [1, p. 65] studies the reaction curves of  the two players in smoothed 
demand games, and confirms Nash's claim that all nontrivial 5 Nash equilibria con- 
verge on the Nash bargaining solution (under mild conditions) in the limiting case 
when y ~ 0 .  (The case of  a piecewise linear boundary is not substantially different 
f rom the case when X has a smooth boundary, which can be treated very easily as in 
Binmore [1, p. 159].) 
With our choice of  the function p,  the reaction curves cross at just one point 
when y > 0. It follows that there is always a unique Nash equilibrium in the contin- 
uous case when y > 0 .  However, since the reaction curves are trapped in the region 
where 0 < p <  1, they get very close together when y becomes small. In fact, given 
5 Excluding those equilibria in which both players make demands that are too large to be 
feasible whatever the other player may demand. 
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any e > 0, we can make any individually rational, Pareto efficient x in X an e-equil- 
ibrium by taking y sufficiently small. 
The Discrete Version 
We restricted players to making demands in multiples of 0.1 of a lottery ticket 
in the belief that we were thereby approximating the continuous version sufficiently 
closely for practical purposes. Figure 3 shows the reaction curves for the resulting 
discrete game. 
Notice that the reaction curves in Figure 3 are very close together where things 
matter. Thus many points along the boundary are e-equilibria for small values of e. 
Note also that the reaction curves actually overlap over some of their range. Thus 
there are multiple exact Nash equilibria. 
The small circles along the boundary in Figure 2 indicate all the nontrivial e- 
equilibria with e = 0.1. There are 83 such equilibria some of which are also e-equili- 
bria for smaller values of e. These e-equilibria indicate a long and narrow region of 
relative stability where the gains from a unilateral deviation are small. There are 12 
nontrivial exact Nash equilibria of the discrete game: (6.3, 3.6), (6.7, 3.5), (7.0, 3.4), 
(7.3, 3.3), (7.6, 3.2), (8.0, 3.1), (8.3, 3.0), (8.5, 2.9), (8.7, 2.8), (8.9, 2.7), (9.1, 2.6), 
and (9.3, 2.5). These equilibria are contained in the large rectangular box shown in 
Figure 2 (and also in Figures 1, 4, and A1). This is the smallest box that contains all 
12 equilibria. 
Near the boundary of the feasible set, small changes in position can have large 
effects. For example, the point (4.7, 4.0) is an e-equilibrium for e = 0.05. However, 
at the nearby point (4.7, 3.8), a type I player can increase his expected payoff  by 
more than 0.7 lottery tickets by deviating from the choice 4.7 when his counterpart 
chooses 3.8. 
Player I's reaction curve 
, /  
§ * §  
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Fig. 3. The  reac t ion  curves  for  the  discrete g a m e  
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The experiment was conducted at the Michigan Economics Laboratory using under- 
graduates of the University of Michigan. The subjects were recruited directly from 
classes rather than from a list of participants in previous experiments. Each subject 
was given a specific time to appear at the laboratory 6 and promised $2 for turning 
up on time, together with: 
. . .  the opportunity to win substantially more depending on how well you bar- 
gain and the circumstances in which you are placed. On average, subjects go 
away with between $10 and $30, but you might end up with more or less. 
Each experimental session used 12 subjects who sat at networked microcomputers 
that were screened from each other. After reading the written instructions given as 
Appendix A1, the subjects participated in an interactive demonstration with the 
computer that was designed to familiarize them with how lottery tickets are con- 
verted into money and how demands are made and converted into lottery tickets. 
Recall that, after each 10 games, a subject who has accumulated N lottery tick- 
ets in these games, wins $10 with probability N%. This was operationalized by 
showing a "roulette wheel" split into a green winning region and a red losing region. 
A small yellow "ball" ran round the circumference of the wheel making appropriate 
noises, finally stopping in either the green or the red region. Where it stopped was 
fixed in advance only in the two demonstrations of its operation. Otherwise, every- 
thing advertized as random was indeed random. 
The feasible set X was shown as a blue region relative to white Cartesian coor- 
dinate axes against a black background. The fuzzy boundary was indicated as a halo 
shading gradually into black. An artist with a trained eye would perhaps have been 
able to deduce the probability that a demand pair in the halo would be accepted 
from the shade of blue at that point. Recall that the subjects occupied the role of 
player I about half the time 7. They were therefore given experience of both roles. 
Player I made demands by moving a cursor along the x-axis. The cursor was 
accompanied by a vertical line. After practising moving the cursor, a subject was 
shown the payoffs that he or she might receive for various demands that player II 
might make: 
1. First a horizontal line appeared that intersected player I's vertical line well 
inside the blue feasible region. The point of intersection was then indicated 
with a flashing white circle. It was explained that each player gets his or her 
demand for certain. 
2. Next a horizontal line appeared so that the point of intersection lay well in- 
side the black region. The point of intersection was indicated with a flashing 
red circle. It was explained that each player gets nothing for certain. 
6 We did not want friends together in the same session. 
7 They did not strictly alternate roles since then they would not get the chance to play all other 
subjects. But they never occupied the same role three times in succession. 
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4. 
Finally a horizontal line appeared so that the point of intersection lay in the 
fuzzy boundary region on the 80% probability contour. The point of inter- 
section was indicated with a flashing white circle and the 80% probability 
contour was shown in white. It was explained that both players would get 
their demands 80% of the time and both players would get nothing 20% of 
the time. 
Subjects received similar information after each practice and real game. Aft- 
er subjects registered their demands, a line was added to each subject's dis- 
play indicating the demand of the opponent with whom he or she had been 
matched. If the intersection of the two demands was well inside the feasible 
set, the message "These claims are always acceptable. You both get your 
claims." was displayed. If the intersection was well outside the feasible set, 
the message "These claims are never acceptable. You both get nothing." was 
shown. 
If the intersection fell near the boundary, for example on the 65% contour, 
then the computer displayed the message "These claims are acceptable 65% 
of the time. The computer accepts/rejects this pair of claims." The word 
"accepts" was shown in white alternating with the word "rejects" in red, the 
former remaining on the screen 65 % of the time. Clicking sounds accompa- 
nied the changes in the words displayed. Eventually the alternation stopped 
and the subjects were informed whether or not they had received their de- 
mands on that particular occasion. 
After practising in player I's role, each subject went through a similar experience in 
the role of player II. Note that we were anxious not to suggest any focal points at 
this stage, and so it was always left to the subject to choose where to place his or her 
demand cursor during the demonstration. Moreover, when the computer simulated 
an opponent, its placing of the opponent's cursor was made a function of the plac- 
ing of the subject's cursor. 
The next step in the demonstration was to teach the subjects to understand the 
information about their potential opponents that would be supplied. They were 
shown a screen with small yellow squares superimposed on the blue feasible region. 
It was explained that each yellow square represents one of the other subjects, each of 
whom is equally likely to be your next opponent. The x-coordinate of the center of a 
square represents the demand that the subject represented by that square last made 
when occupying the role of player I. The y-coordinate represents the demand that he 
or she last made when occupying the role of player II. The computer moved player 
I 's cursor back and forward to show how a yellow square becomes red as the de- 
mand represented by the current placing of player I 's cursor becomes incompatible 
with the demand last made by the subject represented by that square when occupy- 
ing the role of player II. When there is only a probabilityp of the demand pair being 
incompatible, only a fraction p of a yellow square becomes red. As player I's cursor 
is moved, the impression is therefore of a collection of small square vessels being 
slowly filled with blood. 
Subjects in Case 2 were offered only this information about the other subjects. 
Subjects in the main experiment (Case 1) were offered more information. After the 
screens that explained the yellow squares, they were shown the same screens again 
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with the addition of an "expected utility indicator" on the x-axis. This took the form 
of a second cursor that showed the expected number of lottery tickets that player I 
would receive if he or she made the demand indicated by the current placing of his 
or her demand cursor, and the other subjects made the demands indicated by the 
current placing of the yellow squares. The part of the x-axis between the origin and 
the second cursor was highlighted in yellow and the part of the x-axis between the 
second cursor and the demand cursor was highlighted in red. Trials with the equip- 
ment indicate that differences in expected utility as small as 0.025 lottery tickets 
could be detected with this indicator. 
As the demand cursor moved, the second cursor acting as an "expected utility 
indicator" moved also. When it reached its maximum point, it left behind a third 
stationary cursor (like a max-rain thermometer). It was therefore relatively easy for 
a subject so minded to locate the demand that maximized his or her expected utility 
on the myopic assumption that other subjects would play as they did last time. 
After seeing the screens that described how information is presented to player I, 
the subjects were invited to move player I's demand cursor back and forward to see 
how the display changes as the cursor moves. They were then shown the whole thing 
over again from player II 's viewpoint. 
Those who have no experience of presenting information to subjects through 
interactive computer programs may feel that the subjects must have been over- 
whelmed by such a complicated demonstration. However, subjects seemed to have 
very little difficulty in absorbing the information offered. They almost never used 
the facility for calling the assistant to answer questions, and seldom reported any 
confusion about what was expected of them in the questionnaire that they completed 
after the experiment. Perhaps this is not so surprising, since everybody has exper- 
ience of video games requiring the need to absorb far more information much more 
quickly. 
After the demonstration, each subject played 10 "practice games" against "ro- 
bot opponents". These practice games were not simply to familiarize the subjects 
with the way the games were played. The practice games were a deliberate attempt to 
condition the subjects to use one of the focal points on which the experiment con- 
centrated. In each case, the subjects were told that, in the practice games, the yellow 
squares each represented a robot opponent that they might be playing. The initial 
distribution of robot squares is shown by the larger, unlabeled squares in Figure 2. 
Case 1 was separated into four treatments. In Case 1E, the robots were pro- 
grammed to converge slowly on the Equal Increments Solution, E. In Case 1K, the 
robots converged on K, in Case 1N on N, and in Case 1U on U. Case 2 was the same 
as Case 1E, but without the "expected utility indicator". Throughout the experi- 
ment, subjects' screens were updated with information about their potential oppo- 
nents every second game. Note also that convergence was deliberately not total. The 
robots converged only to the extent that they arrived in the neighborhood of the 
selected focal point at the time of the last update during the practice games. 
At the end of the ten practice games, subjects were shown the "roulette wheel" 
and discovered whether they would win or lose a prize for the practice session. They 
were forewarned that the prize for the practice games would be only $1 instead of 
the $10 prize that was at stake in each of the four sets of ten games that were subse- 
quently to be played for real. 
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In each game, subjects were matched at random with the constraints that no 
subject ever played the same opponent twice in succession or occupied the same 
player role three times in succession. The interaction between paired subjects was 
anonymous. Except for their opponent's current demand, subjects were not given 
any information about the identify of their partner. 
After each game, subjects were shown a roulette wheel that exhibited how many 
lottery tickets they had accumulated since it was last "spun". At the end of each set 
of 10 games the roulette wheel was spun for a prize of $10. Our strong impression is 
that such "intermittent reinforcement" does indeed quicken the interest of subjects 
(as psychologists report). However, perhaps more importantly, it also provides some 
mildly entertaining interludes in an experimental session, which although only half 
an hour or so long, could easily become very dull if not broken up into bite-size 
pieces. 
After playing 50 games (10 for practice and 40 for real), the subjects were told 
how much money they had won, and asked to complete a brief computerized ques- 
tionnaire before leaving. Finally, they were called to be paid off one by one with the 
aim of minimizing interaction between subjects as they left the vicinity of the labo- 
ratory. 
4 Resu l t s  
Recall that Case 1 was split into four treatments in which an attempt was made to 
condition subjects to use one of the four focal points E, K, N, or U (by program- 
ming their robot opponents to converge on one of these focal points during the prac- 
tice games). Only treatment E was used in Case 2, which differed from Case 1E only 
in that no "expected utility indicator" was provided. 
In each case, 10 practice games were followed by 40 real games with pauses to 
spin a "roulette wheel" every tenth game. The experiment concluded with a brief 
computerized questionnaire. 
4.1 Case 1 
Figure 1 summarizes the overall picture. This shows the median demand pairs before 
the subjects had any experience, immediately after they had been conditioned by the 
practice games, and at the end of the experiment. All that need be added to the 
discussion of Figure 1 given in the Introduction is that the data better fits the hypo- 
thesis that the subjects were conditioned to play a best response to the robot oppo- 
nents they faced rather than to play the focal point itself. This point is discussed 
further in Section 5 and is, of course, consistent with our overall explanation of the 
data: namely, that the story is one of relentless optimization by the median player. 
394 K. Binmore et al. 
Table A1 of Appendix A2 gives the data from which Figure 1 was constructed to- 
gether with the corresponding data for Case 2. 
Figures Al(a) through Al(e) of Appendix A2 show some typical trajectories for 
median demand pairs over the entire 50 games. For the practice games, the trajecto- 
ries show the median claims of both the subjects and their robot opponents. In prac- 
tice games 1, 4, 6, 7, and 9, the subjects made claims as player I while the computer 
made claims as player II. The roles were reversed in the other practice games. When 
interpreting the trajectories, it is helpful to keep in mind that the x-coordinate of the 
point labeled "10" represents robot rather than human claims. Table A1, on the 
other hand, reports the median human claims in games 9 and 10. That is, Table A1 
reports the median human claims as player I from game 9 and the median human 
claims as player II from game 10. 
Unlike Figures 1 and 4, each point in Figure A1 represents the median demands 
by type I and type II players in a single game rather than a pair of games. The 
numbers in Figure A1 indicate the games that correspond to various points. It was 
not possible to label the same set of games on each trajectory and keep the figures 
legible. 
From the positions of points 9 and 10 on the trajectories for Case 1U, one can 
see that the human claims in the last practice games are close to the utilitarian focal 
point but the trajectories quickly move away from the focal point in the first few 
real games. This pattern, which indicates the difficulty we encountered in condition- 
ing subjects to use the utilitarian focal point U, was also observed in the other three 
trajectories for Case 1U. (One could also turn to Table A1 and, for each treatment, 
compare the median claims made by player I in games 9 and 10 with the median type 
I claims made in games 11 and 12.) 
The extent of the variation in individual claims can also be assessed using Ta- 
bles A1 and A3. The variation indicates that subjects did not always use the "ex- 
pected utility indicator" with any precision, if at all. Such variation in behavior 
should not be dismissed as mere "noise". Computer simulations of myopic adjust- 
ment that we conducted before experimenting with real subjects exhibited much 
slower movement along the boundary away from a "focal point" than was observed 
in the experiment. We believe that the slow convergence of the simulated claims was 
due to the absence of variation in the simulation. 
Other points that can be checked by examining Table A1 are the extent to which 
the subjects within each population group finally converged on the same claim and 
the number of games required for the median claims in each experiment to converge. 
In each experiment, there is little or no difference between the median of the claims 
in the last two games and the median of the claims in the last ten games. That is to 
say, the median claims had already converged by the 41st game. 
4.2 Case 2 
This was an attempt to see how important the ~ utility indicator" is for the 
conclusions of Case 1. It was replication of Case 1E without the expected utility 
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indicator. Figure 4 is the equivalent of Figure 1 for Case 2. The relevant data ap- 
pears in Table A1 of Appendix A2. Figure Al(f)  shows a typical trajectory. 
The results are broadly similar to those reported in Case 1E. This came as yet 
another surprise. How did the subjects manage to behave as though they were op- 
timizing when deprived of the means to do so with the accuracy that their behavior 
seems to indicate? 
4.3 Questionnaire 
In a previous paper (Binmore et al. [2]), a strong tendency was noted for people 
asked after the experiment for their views on what is "fair" to give answers that 
correlate with their experience of what actually happened in the bargaining game 
they had just played. We now briefly explore this issue. The relevant data is con- 
tained in Table A1 of Appendix A28. 
For each experiment, Figure 5 plots against the median of the last claims made 
as player I the median claim said to be "fair" for player I in reply to the question: 
What  do you feel would be a fair amount  for each player to get? 
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Type I claims 
Fig. 4. Summary of results in case 2 
8 Because a subject could be player I or player II for two games in a row, the median claims in 
games 49 and 50 are almost but not quite identical to the median last claims. In experiment 
17, the median of the last claims made as player I was 7.60 and in experiment 21 was 6.70. 
In all other cases, the difference between the median claims in games 49 and 50 and the 
median last claims did not exceed 0.1 lottery ticket. Figure 5 was constructed using the me- 
dian last claims rather than the median claims in games 49 and 50. 
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Median last type I claim 
Fig. 5. Comparison of the medians of the last actual claims made by player I in each experi- 
ment with the medians of the claims said to be "fair" for player I 
Notice the marked tendecy to report as fair what actually happened. 
The line shown in Figure 5 is the least squares regression line obtained by re- 
gressing the median fair claims on the median last claims. It satisfies the equation: 
y = - 0 . 3 9 7 0 +  0.9999x. The standard errors of  the intercept and slope are 1.0748 
and 0.1401 respectively and R2= 0.7282. 
It is perhaps interesting that the points in Figure 5 whose residuals have the 
greatest absolute value are f rom experiments 17 and 18 both from Case 2. If  only 
data from Case 1 is used, the results are essentially the same except that the R 2 
increases to 0.8977. The results are also unaffected if the median last and median 
fair claims for player II  are used instead of  the claims for player I. In all cases, we 
obtain a highly significant relationship between the median fair claims and the me- 
dian last claims and a regression line with an intercept close to 0 and a slope close 
to 1. 
If, for all 252 subjects, we regress the claim which each individual designated as 
fair for player I 0') against the last claim made by that individual as player I (x), 
then we obtain the equation: y=2.2261 + 0.6382x with standard errors 0.7699 and 
0.1007 and R z= O. 1385. There is still a significant relationship, but the unexplained 
variation in the individual claims is much higher than for the median claims. 
A later question asked: 
Is this the sort of  situation in which people ought to "play fair", or is it socially 
acceptable to use whatever bargaining power one has? 
Of the 252 subjects who participated in the entire experiment, 89 subjects, approxi- 
mately 35%, said that one ought to "play fair". The rest said that it was acceptable 
to use one's  bargaining power. 
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This section reports numerical summaries of  the data that complement the graphical 
summaries in Figures 1 to 5 and Figure A1. 
Recall that the subjects'  information about the play of  their potential oppo- 
nents was updated every second game. In order to compare the effects of  the differ- 
ent treatments in Case 1 and to study the stability of  the focal points, we consider 
the subjects'  claims in the last practice games, 9 and 10, the first real games, 11 and 
12, and the last real games, 49 and 50. For  each treatment,  Table 1 reports informa- 
tion about  the median claims in these pairs of  games. 
Table 1. For selected pairs of games, this table reports Euclidean and standardized measures 
of distance from the populations of median claims in each treatment to the appropriate focal 
points and to the median myopic best replies to the robot claims in games 9 and 10. The table 
also reports the means of the maximum gains obtained by unilateral deviations from each pair 
in the designated sets of median claims. Table 1 uses the median claims reported in Table A1 
and the maximum gains from a unilateral deviation reported in Table A3 as input 
Games Euclidean p-value for Euclidean p-value for Mean 
distance Hotelling's distance Hotelling's maximum 
T 2 T 2 gain from 
a deviation 
Case 1, E 
Focal point 
9 & 10 0.690 0.0057 
11 & 12 0.708 0.0007 
49 & 50 2.637 lt..0001 
Case 1, K 
Focal point 
9&10 0.261 0.1157 
11 & 12 0.295 0.2675 
49 & 50 0.841 0.3460 
Case 1, N 
Focal point 
9 & 10 0.237 0.1267 
11 & 12 0.409 0.0378 
49 & 50 0.130 0.2765 
Case 1, U 
Focal point 
9 & 10 0.160 0.0576 
11 & 12 0.977 0.0095 
49 & 50 1.548 0.0015 
Case 2, E 
Focal point 
9 & 10 0.620 0.0544 
l l & 1 2  0.905 0.0315 
49 & 50 3.274 0.0028 
Myopic best reply 
0.210 0.2412 0.514 
0.234 0.0065 0.609 
2.127 0.0002 0.011 
Myopic best reply 
0.134 0.1316 0.584 
0.589 0.2559 0.655 
0.554 0.5756 0.048 
Myopic best reply 
0.097 0.2712 0.254 
0.201 0.0322 0.214 
0.117 0.4508 0.018 
Myopic best reply 
0.117 0.1786 0.160 
0.860 0.0480 0.564 
1.413 0.0041 0.025 
Myopic best reply 
0.156 0.1451 0.379 
0.399 0.1335 0.295 
2.765 0.0053 0.036 
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The data used to construct Table 1, as well as Figures 1, 4, and 5, is contained 
in Tables A1 and A3 of Appendix A2 and summarized in Table A2. For each experi- 
ment, Table A1 reports the median and the standard deviation of the populations of 
type I and type II claims in selected pairs of games. Table A1 also reports the me- 
dian and standard deviation for the populations of claims in the last 10 games, 41 
through 50, and for the populations of claims that were designated as "fair" for each 
type of player in the questionnaire at the end of the experiment. 
We can regard each of the pairs of type I and type II median claims reported in 
Table A1 as a single data point. The replications of each treatment then provide a 
population of data points for each pair of games. Table A2 reports summary statis- 
tics for each of these populations. The statistics in Table 1 were also constructed by 
treating the pairs of median claims in Table A1 as two-dimensional data points. 
The second column of Table 1 reports the Euclidean distance between the center 
of gravity of each population of median claims and the relevant focal point. (The 
coordinates of the centers of gravity are reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table A29.) 
These distances confirm the impression left by Figures 1 and 4 that, for each case 
and treatment, the distance between the population of medians in the last practice or 
first real games and the treatment's focal point is always small compared, for exam- 
ple, to the distance between adjacent focal points. 
For Case 1U, the jump in the distance to the utilitarian focal point from the last 
practice to the first real games is an indication of the difficulty we had in condition- 
ing subjects to begin play at the utilitarian point. Note also that the distance from 
the populations to their respective focal points increases substantially from the first 
to the last real games for Cases 1E, 1U, and Case 2. The distance increases some- 
what for Case 1K and actually decreases for Case 1N. The change in the distance 
from the populations of medians to their focal points over the course of the real 
games is one index of the relative stability of the four focal points. 
Is the distance between the center of gravity of each population and the relevant 
focal point small or large relative to the variation within the population? If the data 
were one-dimensional, the t-statistic could be used to measure the distance from the 
sample mean to the focal point in units of the estimated standard deviation of the 
sample mean. Column 3 of Table 1 measures distances using Hotelling's T 2 statistic 
which is a multidimensional generalization of the t-statistic 1~ 
Just as the t-statistic can be used to construct confidence intervals around the 
sample mean, the two-dimensional T 2 statistic can be used to construct confidence 
ellipses around a sample's center of gravity. Rather than directly reporting the value 
of T 2, column 3 of Table 1 reports the p-value of the confidence ellipse that sur- 
rounds the center of gravity of each population of median claims and passes through 
the appropriate focal point. 
Smaller p-values correspond to ellipses that are further from the center of grav- 
ity. Under the assumption that the population of median claims represents a sample 
drawn from a bivariate normal distribution, a p-value less than 0.05 implies that one 
9 The x and y coordinates of the center of gravity of a cloud of two-dimensional points are the 
means of the x and y coordinates of the points in the cloud. 
lo See Rao [13] (or any good text on multivariate statistics) for a definition and discussion of 
the properties of Hotelling's T 2 statistic. 
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can reject the hypothesis that  the center of  gravity of  the true distr ibution is equal to 
the focal point  with a level of  confidence greater than 95%. However,  caution 
should be used in interpreting the standardized distances in this way, especially in 
light of  the small numner  of  observations (3 or 5) in each sample. 
I f  the median subject in the practice games of  each experiment opt imized myo- 
pically against  his or her robot  opponents ,  then the median claim in the last practice 
games would not  necessarily be close to the focal point.  Instead, this claim would be 
close to the myopic best reply to the popula t ion  of  robot  opponents  in games 9 and 
10. 
The popula t ion  of  robot  opponents  varied slightly from subject to subject with- 
in the same treatment.  However,  by games 9 and 10, the myopic best replies to the 
possible populat ions  of  robots  within each treatment  were virtually identical n.  Let 
Ebr denote the ordered pair  of  medians of  the myopic best replies by type I and type 
II players respectively to the robot  populat ions  in games 9 and 10 of  Case 1E (and 
Case 2). Ebr = (4.6, 4.0). For  Case 1K, Kbr = (7.1, 3.4). For  Case IN,  Nbr = (8.2, 3.0). 
For  Case IU, Ubr = (9.8, 2.2). 
Columns 4 and 5 of  Table 1 report  the same statistics as columns 2 and 3 except 
that  the distances measured are those between the centers of  gravity of  each popula-  
t ion and the relevant median myopic best replies rather than the relevant focal 
points.  
For  Case 2 and each treatment  of  Case 1, the Euclidean distance f rom the cen- 
ter of  gravity of  the median claims in games 9 and 10 to the median myopic best 
reply is less than the distance to the corresponding focal point.  In each case, the 
p-value  measuring the s tandardized distance to the focal point  is smaller (so the 
standardized distance is greater) than the p-value measuring the distance to the 
myopic best reply. I f  Hotet l ing 's  T 2 statistic were used as the basis of  a hypothesis 
test, we would be unable to reject the hypothesis that  the center of  gravity of  the true 
distr ibution of  each sample of  median claims in games 9 and 10 is the relevant 
myopic  best reply. Statistical tests on the populat ions  of  individual  subjects '  claims 
in games 9 and 10 support  a similar conclusion 12. 
"In other respects, the alternate distance measures in columns 3, 4, and 5 of  
Table 1 reinforce the informat ion  conveyed by the distances reported in column 2. 
n In.the real games, subjects were shown the previous claims of each of their 11 possible 
opponents. However, in the practice games only 10 (out of a possible 11) robot squares 
were displayed at a time, and which squares were displayed variedrandomly from subject 
to subject. By games 9 and 10, the 11 possible populations of robot opponents in each 
treatment were all very similar, so that this source of variation had almost no effect on the 
myopic best replies. For each treatment, the difference between the largest and the smallest 
myopic best reply for player I in games 9 and 10 was less than or equal to 0.2 lottery tickets. 
For best replies by player II, the difference was less than or equal to 0.1 lottery ticket. 
12 A sign test was used to test the hypothesis that the median of the population of type I 
claims made by each subject in game 9 pooled across all replications of the same treatment 
was the same as the median of the myopic best replies to the populations of robot claims 
for that treatment. (See, for example, Gibbons and Chakraborti [4] for a description and 
analysis of the sign test.) For each treatment, we were unable to reject this hypothesis at the 
usual 5~ level of significance. A similar test for the populations of type II claims in game 
10 was unable to reject the hypothesis for each of the four populations of type II claims in 
Case 1. For the type II claims in Case 2, the sign test would reject the hypothesis at the 507o 
but not the 1 07o level of significance. 
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For Case 1E, Case 1U, and Case 2, the Euclidean distance from the myopic best 
reply increases considerably from the first to the last pair of real games. The corre- 
sponding p-values for both the focal point and myopic best reply all decrease. The 
Euclidean distance to the myopic best reply in Case 1K is relatively small and ap- 
proximately the same in games 11 and 12 and games 49 and 50. The Euclidean dis- 
tances to the best reply for Case 1N are even smaller than for Case 1K and the 
distance from the center of gravity in games 49 and 50 is less than the distance in 
games 11 and 12. All four p-values in games 11 and 12 and games 49 and 50 of Case 
1K are relatively large. The p-values for Case 1N increase from the first to the last 
pair of real games I3. 
By comparing the median claims reported in Table 1A for games 49 and 50 with 
the coordinates of the exact Nash equilibria reported in Section 2.2, one can confirm 
that the median claims in each experiment typically end up very close to one of the 
exact Nash equilibria of the discrete demand game. Table A3 of Appendix A2 fur- 
ther investigates the convergence of the subjects' claims to e-equilibria of the dis- 
crete game. 
For the designated games of each experiment, Table A3 reports the maximum 
expected gain that a player can achieve by deviating from the median claim for his 
type that was reported in Table A1 when the player expects his opponent to make 
the corresponding median claim that was reported for her type in Table A1. The 
reported gain is the maximum of that achievable by either type I or type II players. 
The last column in Table 1 reports the mean of the maximum expected gains in 
Table A3 for each series of experiments. 
In every experiment, including those where there was no expected utility indica- 
tor, Table A3 shows that by the last real games the median subjects had found their 
way to e-equilibria for remarkably small values of e. 
As indicated in Tables 1 and A3, at least one type of player could typically 
receive an expected gain of about 0.5 lottery tickets (or 1 nickel) by unilaterally de- 
viating from the median claim in the first real games of an experiment. An expected 
gain of that size would have been easily observable with the expected utility indicator 
provided to subjects in Case 1. Moreover, an increase of 0.5 lottery tickets in each of 
40 real games corresponds to a 20 percent greater chance of winning 10 dollars or an 
expected gain of 2 dollars. Such a gain, while not large, might not have been negli- 
gible in the eyes of the subjects. By the last real games of the experiment, the typical 
gain obtained by a unilateral deviation from the median claims had shrunk to about 
0.03 lottery tickets (about 1/3 of a penny or 12 cents over the course of 40 
games). 
The standard deviations reported in Table A1 show that not all subjects made 
claims close to the median especially in the early games of an experiment. The num- 
bers reported in parentheses in Table A3 help assess the implications of this variabil- 
ity. 
13 The correlation coefficients reported in Table A2 indicate that the populations of medians 
in games 49 and 50 are almost "one-dimensional'. One might therefore wonder if, after all, 
a one-dimensional standardized distance might be more appropriate than one based on Ho- 
telling's T a statistic. It turns out that p-values based on the t-statistic for the populations of 
median type I claims exhibit qualitative behavior which is similar to that of the p-values 
reported in Table 1. 
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For each pair of games and each experiment, one can calculate the maximum 
expected gain that a player can achieve by deviating from a particular claim when 
the player's opponent chooses randomly from the 12 opposing claims actually made 
in these games. By calculating a maximum expected gain in this way for each of the 
the 24 type I and type II claims actually made in a particular pair of games, one 
obtains a population of 24 maximum expected gains from a deviation. The first 
number of each pair in parentheses in Table A3 is the median of such a population 
of maximum expected gains. The second number is the 90th percentile of these 
gains. 
The median expected gain defined in this way differs from the expected gain 
discussed earlier partly because in one case each claim is matched against a popula- 
tion of opposing claims while in the other case a claim is matched only against the 
single opposing median claim. Nevertheless, the two statistics behave similarly. In 
almost all experiments, the median expected gain decreases from the first to the last 
pair of real games. In addition, the median expected gain in the last real games is 
often less than 0.1 lottery ticket (that is less than 1 penny) and always less than 0.2 
lottery tickets. 
The 90th-percentile expected gains also typically decrease from the first to the 
last pair of real games in each experiment. Part of this decrease is probably due to 
the tightening of the distributions of claims around their medians which is also 
shown by the changes in the standard deviations reported in Table A1. However, the 
magnitudes of the 90th-percentile expected gains are also noteworthy. In a number 
of experiments, this percentile is greater than 0.5 lottery tickets even in the last pair 
of real games. This supports the conclusion stated earlier that, although the median 
subject may optimize relentlessly, this is not necessarily true of every subject in every 
game. 
6 Conclusions 
The results of this series of experiments provide no comfort for those who argue that 
strategic considerations have little relevance to how people resolve coordination 
problems. If  people are equipped with social norms that are relevant to the problem 
faced by our subjects, then it seems that a small amount of conditioning is sufficient 
to displace them in favor of a focal point of the experimenter's choice. Thereafter 
the median subject seems to optimize insofar as circumstances allow. In our experi- 
ment, this means optimizing right down to fractions of a penny. However, the sub- 
jects seem to see no contradiction between such optimizing and "fair" behavior, 
since the median subject reports as fair pretty much what actually happened towards 
the end of the games that he or she played. These results are consistent with a view 
that regards behavior as being Shaped by social norms in the minds of the subjects, 
but which sees the social norms themselves being determined by evolutionary consid- 
erations of which the subjects are only dimly aware. 
However, we do not think it appropriate to make any wide claims for game 
theory as a predictor of human behavior, in spite of what we regard as the remark- 
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able sharpness of  our results. The reason is that  we are vulnerable to the criticism 
that  we made the process of  "myopic adjustment"  focal by featuring it in our graph- 
ic display 14. One reply to this criticism is to note the similarity between the results in 
Case 1E and Case 2, even though the expected utility indicator  was absent in the 
second situation. However,  the impor tant  point  is much less tendentious.  
We do not  argue that  social norms that  isolate part icular  focal points are un- 
impor tant  in determining how people behave both inside and outside the laboratory.  
This paper  is about  how social norms get established and extinguished. In part icular,  
we believe that  it is a major  error to suppose that  social norms are commonly so 
rigid that  they are able to sustain behavior in the long run that  is not  in equilibrium. 
Our experiment shows that  it is relatively easy to displace whatever norms our sub- 





In this experiment,  you will bargain via the computing equipment in front of  you 
with the people seated at the the other machines in the room.  You will part icipate in 
a large number of  very short bargaining sessions. Whether  you are player I or player 
II in these sessions is determined randomly.  Sometimes you will be player I and 
sometimes player  II.  Af ter  each session, you will be randomly  paired with a new 
bargaining partner.  
In each bargaining session, you and your counterpart  for that  session will have 
the oppor tuni ty  to split a "cake" between you. The cake will be represented by a 
blue region on your moni tor  screen. You will each simultaneously make a claim. If  
the pair of  claims made by you and your counterpar t  lies well within the blue region 
on your screen, then you each get your claims. I f  the pair  of  claims lies well outside 
the blue region, you both get nothing in that  session. I f  the pair  of  claims lies close 
to the boundary  of  the blue region, then the computer  will sometimes allow the 
claims and sometimes it will disallow them. The closer the pair  of  claims is to the 
boundary  of  the blue region, the less likely the computer  is to find them accepta- 
ble. 
14 We do not accept that such criticism can be neglected because it involves a "Catch 22". 
Nobody anticipates that subjects would optimize if they were not provided with informa- 
tion in an easily digestible form that indicates what optimal behavior is. The catch is that 
the necessary information cannot be provided without focusing attention on what is opti- 
mal. 
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You will be bargaining for lottery tickets. After every ten bargaining sessions, 
each player may possibly win $10. Each lottery ticket that you acquired during the 
preceding ten bargaining sessions gives you one chance of a win, How many lottery 
tickets you get during the bargaining will depend partly on chance. If you bargain so 
as to maximize the number of lottery tickets that you would get on average, this will 
make the probability of winning $10 largest. Since you will take part in forty ses- 
sions in all, you will have four separate opportunities of winning $10. If you are very 
lucky, you may therefore win $40 on top of your participation flee. But please do 
not complain if you win nothing at all. When things are done at random, it is una- 
voidable that some people will be unlucky. 
After the bargaining sessions are over, you will be asked to complete a compu- 
terized questionnaire. When all subjects have completed the questionnaire, the com- 
puter will display how much we owe you. The amount will include your $2 attend- 
ance fee, and any money you won during the experiment. Please remain in your seat 
until the supervisor calls your seat number and then bring your seat tag so that you 
can be paid. 
This is not an experiment to find out what kind of person you are. When we see 
the results, we shall neither know nor care who did what. We are only interested in 
what happens on average. So please don't  feel that some particular sort of behavior 
is expected of you. However, we do ask that you do not talk to the other subjects or 
look at their screens. It is important to the experiment that our subjects interact only 
via the computer equipment. 
Now press the SPACE BAR on your keyboard. You will see a demonstration 
that will review the information in these instructions and give you hands-on exper- 
ience of how claims are made. Remember to keep pressing the SPACE BAR to see a 
new screen. There is no need to hurry. You may have to wait for the other subjects 
to be ready anyway. If you still have questions after seeing the demonstration, there 
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Focal Points and Bargaining 407 
Table A2. Summary statistics describing the median type I and type II claims reported in Table 
A1 for each treatment and selected pairs of games 
Games Mean Standard Mean Standard Correlation 
deviation deviation coefficient 
Case 1, E, 5 experiments 
Type I claims Type II claims 
9 & 10 4.790 0.185 4.090 0.089 0.634 
11 & 12 4.750 0.150 3.820 0.057 0.585 
49 & 50 6.670 0.367 3.510 0.108 -0 .997  
Case 1, K, 3 experiments 
Type I claims Type II claims 
9 & 10 7.033 0.431 3.517 0.029 - 0 . 7 7 0  
11 & 12 6.517 0.575 3.317 0.029 -0 .025  
49 & 50 7.617 0.486 3.200 0.173 -0 .951  
Case 1, N, 3 experiments 
Type I claims Type II claims 
9 & 10 8.250 0.200 3.083 0.029 0.000 
11 & 12 8.000 0.180 2.983 0.076 - 0 . 9 9 9  
49 & 50 8.317 0.284 3.000 0.100 - 0.967 
Case 1, U, 5 experiments 
Type I claims Type II claims 
9 & 10 9.740 0.096 2.100 0.197 - 0.627 
11 & 12 8.950 0.533 2.330 0.057 -0 .617  
49 &50 8.540 0.578 2.840 0.238 -0 .995  
Case 2, E, 5 experiments 
Type I claims Type II claims 
9 & 10 4.720 0.291 4.100 0.079 - 0 . 2 1 8  
11 & 12 4.970 0.340 3.850 0.100 - 0 . 7 7 2  
49 & 50 7.280 0.591 3.320 0.175 - 0.972 
408 K. Binmore et al. 
Table A3. For selected pair of games in each experiment, this table reports the maximum 
expected gain that a player can achieve by deviating from the median claim for his type that 
was reported in Table A1 when the player expects his opponent to make the corresponding 
median claim that was reported for her type in Table A1. The gain is the maximum of that 
achievable by player I and player II. The numbers assigned to each experiment are the same as 
those assigned in Table A1. (The numbers in parentheses are the median and 90th percentile of 
the maximum expected gains obtained by deviating optimally from each of the type I or type 
II claims made in the designated pair of games.* The maximum expected gain in this case is 
calculated assuming that a claim is matched randomly against one of the 12 opposing claims 
actually made in the designated games.) 
Case 1, E 
Expt. 1 2 3 4 5 
Games 
9 &10 0.523 0.007 1.311 0.541 0.188 
(0.352 1.962) (0.183 1.480) (1.083 2.582) (0.605 1.917) (0.153 0.461) 
11 & 12 1.021 0.247 0.734 0.308 0.734 
(0.326 0.770) (0.103 0.532) (0.169 0.528) (0.119 0.436) (0.130 0.575) 
49 & 50 0.014 0.000 0.005 0.013 0.025 
(0.074 0.344) (0.057 0.874) (0.103 0.614) (0.057 0.308) (0.034 0.344) 
Case 1, K 
Expt. 6 7 8 
Games 
9 & 10 0.065 1.558 0.129 
(0.254 1.425) (0.964 2.548) (0.533 3.090) 
11 & 12 1.274 0.124 0.567 
(0.263 1.885) (0.030 0.385) (0.186 0.717) 
49 & 50 0.039 0.034 0.071 
(0.061 0.133) (0.052 0.126) (0.173 0.520) 
Case 1, N 
Expt. 9 10 11 
Games 
9 & 10 0.019 0.690 0.053 
(0.057 0.611) (0.731 2.286) (0.277 1.874) 
11 & 12 0.166 0.221 0.256 
(0.079 0.841) (0.060 0.457) (0.245 1.053) 
49 & 50 0.000 0.006 0.047 
(0.008 0.150) (0.029 0.392) (0.171 0.441) 
Case 1, U 
Expt. 12 13 14 15 16 
Games 
9 & 10 0.155 0.018 0.041 0.161 0.428 
(0.260 2.221) (0.212 0.460) (0.300 1.826) (0.116 2.458) (0.284 2.039) 
11 & 12 0.427 0.167 1.377 0.531 0.322 
(0.149 1.440) (0.108 1.024) (0.229 1.807) (0.097 1.952) (0.169 1.471) 
49 & 50 0.041 0.021 0.000 0.023 0.041 
(0.062 0.183) (0.040 0.250) (0.125 0.985) (0.085 0.417) (0.010 0.409) 
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Table A3 (continued) 
Case 2, E 
Expt. 17 18 19 20 21 
Games 
9 & 10 0.404 0.523 0.007 0.866 0.093 
(0.228 1.614) (0.514 1.771) (0.523 2.210) (0.650 1.481) (0.107 0.871) 
11 & 12 0.307 0.159 0.484 0.017 0.508 
(0.121 0.786) (0.245 1.175) (0.208 1.255) (0.033 0.550) (0.225 1.406) 
49 & 50 0.003 0.004 0.130 0.043 0.000 
(0.118 0.608) (0.043 0.229) (0.189 0.765) (0.122 0.613) (0.077 0.373) 
* There are 24 type I or type II claims and, hence, 24 maximum expected gains associated with 
each pair of games and each experiment. The median is the average of the 12th and 13th 
largest maximum expected gains. The 90th percentile is the average of the 3rd and 4th largest 
expected gains 
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